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Abstract 
The past decade has witnessed the dynamics of ṣukūk structuring 
amidst legal complexities in cases involving enforcement of the rights 
of investors or ṣukūk holders in the event of default. This paper 
examines the legal and beneficial ownership in a typical sovereign 
ṣukūk structure and the specific rights of the parties under the 
existing practice and classical Islamic legal framework. The issue of 
public property often used in sovereign ṣukūk as the underlying asset 
of the transaction leaves much to be desired. Through a systematic 
content analysis, this study uses the qualitative legal research method 
to analyse a number of sovereign ṣukūk structures gathered from 
available ṣukūk prospectuses. The study finds that the nature of legal 
and beneficial ownership in ṣukūk transplanted from the 
conventional bonds structuring is different from the type of 
ownership envisaged in Islamic commercial law. It is found that the 
modern structure of ṣukūk products only allows for beneficial 
ownership to be conferred on ṣukūk holders, and this does not 
contradict any principle of Islamic law when one considers the true 
nature of beneficial ownership under common law. Though it 
literally falls short of a true sale in Islamic law in the event of 
default, a closer look of the legal structure reveals the true nature of 
beneficial ownership. The mere fact that ṣukūk holders can have 
recourse against the underlying asset justifies the conferment of true 
ownership. Nevertheless, the stakeholders may still need to consider 
the use of public property as the underlying asset of a sovereign 
ṣukūk. With the increasing interest of emerging economies in ṣukūk 
to meet their long-term financing needs, this study is expected to 
guide the global Islamic finance industry on Sharī‘ah and legal 
issues relating to sovereign ṣukūk. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, two major milestones were recorded in the history of 
sovereign ṣukūk.1 Beyond the original frontiers of Islamic finance, 
there were two major European ṣukūk issuances within the year in the 
United Kingdom and Luxembourg respectively. While the UK 
government issued a £200 million ṣukūk using ṣukūk al-ijārah 
structure in July 2014, the Luxembourg government also issued a 
£200 million ṣukūk in October 2014 which was based on the ṣukūk 
al-ijārah structure.2 For Luxembourg, there was a delay in the ṣukūk 
issuance as there was a need to enact the Ṣukūk Law (Law 6631 on 
sale and buy-back transaction of real estate assets) to provide the 
basis for the issuance of the first sovereign Sharī‘ah-compliant bond 
within the Eurozone.3  
Though the Islamic financial products and services have 
spread beyond the original frontiers of Islamic finance as since 
witnessing tremendous growth in the past decade, there remains a 
key challenge of operating under conventional legal systems which 
have some alien legal principles not known to traditional Islamic law. 
In fact, Grassa & Gazdar clearly demonstrated how legal origins 
shape the nature of Islamic finance and its development across the 
world.4 One such area affected is the type of ownership conferred on 
                                                                
1 This study was carried out under the research grant scheme of the Islamic 
Research and Training Institute, Islamic Development Bank (IRTI-IDB), Jeddah. 
The author acknowledges IRTI-IDB for its immense financial support. JEL 
classification: G21 G28 K12 K41. 
2Linklaters, “GCC Quarterly Review – Q3 2014,” 2014, http://www.linklaters.com/ 
pdfs/mkt/dubai/GCC_Quarterly_Review_Q3_2014.pdf. 
3 The Law was finally passed into a law on 9th July 2014 which prepared the 
grounds for the issuance of the sovereign ṣukūk in Luxembourg.  
4 Rihab Grassa and Kaouthar Gazdar, “Law and Islamic Finance: How Legal 
Origins Affect Islamic Finance Development?,” Borsa Istanbul Review 14, no. 3 
(2014): 158–66. 
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the investors in ṣukūk transaction.5 This has led to the legal and 
beneficial ownership conundrum when it comes to issues affecting 
the underlying assets of a ṣukūk issuance, particularly in the event of 
default or near default that may trigger debt restructuring.6 The 
enormity of this challenge is further exacerbated with the increasing 
interest in ṣukūk products across the world, particularly in 
jurisdictions that are of civil or common law origin. For instance, the 
exact form of the common law concept of trust is not in any way 
recognised under civil law.7  
A shared primary objective of both the conventional and 
Islamic financial systems is access to credit facilities and consumer 
protection, which includes investor protection. Investor protection is 
primarily secured through adequate legal protection for investors, 
particularly in the equity market.8 This is a core element also in the 
debt market where liquidity is paramount for financing projects. To 
this end, La Porta, et al, contend that “when investors finance firms, 
they typically obtain certain rights or powers that are generally 
protected through the enforcement of regulations and laws.”9 Such 
rights enable the investors to gain more information about accounting 
and disclosure issues which then provides a good knowledge base for 
them to exercise other relevant rights when required.10 
With a focus on ṣukūk, this study examines the rules relating to 
legal and beneficial ownership of underlying assets in ṣukūk 
transactions. It goes without saying that in the global ṣukūk market, 
the majority of the issuances are sovereign ṣukūk which are generally 
asset-based. From the economic perspective, such asset-based 
                                                                
5 A Roger Wedderburn-Day, “Sovereign Sukuk: Adaptation and Innovation,” Law 
& Contemporary Problems 73, no. 4 (2010): 325–33. 
6 Umar A. Oseni, “Dispute Management in Islamic Financial Institutions: A Case 
Study of near Sukuk Defaults,” Journal of International Trade Law and Policy 13, 
no. 3 (2014): 198–214. 
7 George Gretton, “Trust and Patrimony,” in Scots Law into the 21st Century: 
Essays in Honour of W.A.Wilson, ed. Hector MacQueen (Edinburgh: W. Greens / 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1996), 182–92. 
8 Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Wolfenzon, “Investor Protection and Equity Markets,” 
Journal of Financial Economics 66, no. 1 (2002): 3–27. 
9 Rafael La Porta et al., “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance,” Journal of 
Financial Economics 58, no. 1 (2000): 6. 
10 Ibid., 6 – 7. 
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sovereign ṣukūk are not in any way different from conventional 
bonds.11  
This study begins with a brief overview of the major 
differences between asset-based and asset-backed ṣukūk when it 
comes to the structuring of sovereign ṣukūk. The study proceeds from 
the following assumptions and premises: first, the nature of legal and 
beneficial ownership in ṣukūk transplanted from the conventional 
bonds structuring is different from the type of ownership envisaged 
in Islamic commercial law; second, the modern structure of ṣukūk 
products only allows for beneficial ownership to be conferred on 
ṣukūk holders, which is often considered as falling short of a true sale 
in Islamic law; and third, even though some scholars have likened the 
English law of trust to such structures as waqf and other concepts, the 
underlying principles and the nature of the concepts differ in great 
detail. However, such practical differences do not render the trust 
model non-Sharīʿah compliant. This study therefore examines the 
extent this conundrum could be resolved within the context of the 
modern legal systems which ultimately govern Islamic financial 
transactions. Primarily, this study relies on both legal and Sharī‘ah 
analyses in arriving at its conclusion.  
2.  CONCEPTUALISING THE OWNERSHIP CONUNDRUM 
IN ṢUKŪK 
The literature on sovereign ṣukūk and the nature of legal and 
beneficial ownership in asset-backed ṣukūk transactions can be better 
understood through a three-pronged review of relevant studies. To 
this end, the relevant literatures are based on the following 
categorization: the nature and types of ownership in Islamic law, 
legal issues in ṣukūk in Islamic finance, sovereign ṣukūk and 
ownership in ṣukūk and remedies available to the ṣukūk holders in the 
event of default. 
 
                                                                
11  Bill Maurer, “Form versus Substance: AAOIFI Projects and Islamic 
Fundamentals in the Case of Sukuk,” Journal of Islamic Accounting and Business 
Research 1, no. 1 (2010): 32–41; Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, Islamic Finance: Law, 
Economics, and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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2.1 The nature of ownership in Islamic law 
In Islamic law, ownership is different from possession since it is 
possible to own a property without having its full possession at a 
material time, as it is possible to have possession of a property 
without necessarily being the owner. In his detailed work, al-Bari 
defines ownership as the right to possess, sell, use and donate a 
property which belongs to the person who possesses such a right to 
exclusion of others. 12  A more precise definition is given by 
Al-Zuhayli where ownership (al-milkiyyah) is defined as a definitive 
legal relationship “between a human being and property, which 
renders the property specifically attached to him, and which gives the 
owner the right to deal in that property unless there is a legal 
impediment to a specific dealing”.13 Therefore, subject to any legal 
impediment, ownership in Islamic law is absolute and the rule of 
exclusivity applies. Al-Zuhayli considers the best definition of 
ownership as “an exclusive association of the owned item with its 
owner, which gives the owner the right to deal in what he owns in 
any way that is not legally forbidden.”14  
From the above definition, it is evident that the element of 
exclusivity is emphatically recognized as a core element of 
ownership in Islamic law. 15  The implication of the element of 
exclusivity is that others are prevented from using or dealing with the 
property except with express legal authorization. 16  In situations 
where there is legal authorization which confers some rights on 
another party to deal with the property such as in cases of 
guardianship or agency, the appointed parties only derive their rights 
from the original owner and merely act as proxy for the owner; 
hence, the original owner of the property still has the exclusive 
                                                                
12 Abdul Hamid Mahmud Al-Bari, Dawabit Al-Fiqhiyyah Al-Milkiyyah (Cairo: 
Matabi‘al-Ittihad al-Dawli Li al-Bunuk al-Islamiyyah, 1982). 
13 Wahbah Al-Zuhayli, Al-Fiqh Al-Islam Wa Adillatuh (Islamic Jurisprudence and 
Its Proofs): Financial Transactions in Islamic Jurisprudence, trans. Mahmood 
El-Gamal, vol. 2 (Damascus: Dar Al-Fikr, 2002), 417. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Muhammad Yusuf Saleem, An Introduction to the Theoretical Foundations of 
Islamic Transactions, 3rd ed. (Selangor, Malaysia: Ilmiah Publishers, 2012), 69–77. 
16 Ala al-Din Abu Bakr Bin Mas’ud Al-Kasani, Bada’i’ Al-Sana’i’ Fi Tartib 
Al-Shara’i’ (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1986). 
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ownership of the property under the law.17 In the case of a child who 
has an appointed guardian to deal with a property, the legal 
ownership of the property vests in the child even though he or she 
has a temporary legal impediment. Once such a legal impediment is 
removed, the child will then have full rights to deal with the property 
exclusively without the need of a guardian.18 
In espousing the broad nature and definition of ownership in 
Islamic law, the usufruct or benefit derived from a property and legal 
rights can also be a subject of ownership. This is recognized in the 
definition of ownership in Article 127 of The Mejelle where 
ownership is defined as “anything owned by a human being, be it a 
specified property (‘ayn), or usufruct of a property (manfa’)”.19 A 
broad classification of ownership may categorise the concept into 
private and public ownership depending on the subject matter of 
ownership and how it is acquired. Furthermore, Al-Zuhayli classified 
ownership into two broad categories according to the rights acquired 
by the owner of the property.20 The two categories are complete 
ownership (al-milk al-tāmah) and partial ownership (al-milk 
al-nāqis).  
According to Abu Zahrah, the definitions of ownership above 
which emphasise on exclusivity in use, disposal and enjoyment of 
full rights in the property represent what is referred to as complete 
ownership;21 hence, a complete ownership may be defined as the 
type of exclusive ownership in property where the owner enjoys full 
legal rights associated with the title to the property and the 
consequential benefits derivable from the property such as the 
                                                                
17 Nazura Abdul Manap, Ahmad Azam Mohd Shariff, and Safinaz Mohd Hussein, 
“Database: Its Position Under Islamic Law of Property,” The Social Sciences 9, no. 3 
(2014): 228–38. 
18 Muhammad Abu Zahrah, Al-Milkiyyah Wa Nazariyyah Al-“aqd Fi Al-Shari”ah 
Al-Islamiyyah (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-‘Arabi, 1996). 
19  Charles Robert Tyser, D. G. Demetriades, and Ismail Ḥaqqi Effendi, The 
Mejelle : Being an English Translation of Majallah El-Ahkam-I-Adliya and a 
Complete Code on Islamic Civil Law (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2007). 
20  Al-Zuhayli, Al-Fiqh Al-Islam Wa Adillatuh (Islamic Jurisprudence and Its 
Proofs): Financial Transactions in Islamic Jurisprudence. 
21 Abu Zahrah, Al-Milkiyyah Wa Nazariyyah Al-“aqd Fi Al-Shari”ah Al-Islamiyyah. 
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usufruct. 22  On the other hand, partial ownership involves an 
incomplete legal ownership of the property which limits the full 
rights or benefits derivable from such property.23 There are three 
unique types of partial ownership in Islamic law. These are 
ownership of the property alone, personal usufruct ownership, and 
easement rights (ḥaqq al-irtifāq). 
There is a tendency to easily attribute complete ownership to 
what is known as legal and beneficial ownership under the common 
law. Partial ownership has also been likened to a situation where 
there is legal ownership without beneficial ownership or vice versa. 
The foregoing classification might not be appropriate when one 
considers the nature of two diametrically diverse legal systems 
involved. Meanwhile, complete or total ownership can be established 
in four different ways under Islamic law. These are commonly 
accessible property, contracts, succession, and derivation from owned 
property. For the purpose of this study, the type of ownership 
contemplated is acquisition of ownership through contracts. 
Nevertheless, within the context of the modern discourse of 
ownership, one may reconsider the definition of a sale which is one 
of the precursors to the conferment of ownership. The nature of sale 
itself will determine what type of ownership is conferred through the 
sale contracts.  
For Imam Al-Nawawī, a sale contract involves the exchange of 
a specified commodity owned by a person for another which involves 
an exchange of ownership. Apart from just an exchange of 
ownership, Ibn Qudāmah emphasizes that the new owner must take 
the possession of the subject matter of the contract. For the Hanafi 
jurists, a property that is capable of being the subject matter of a sale 
contract must be such that it is desired by people generally and must 
possess such a quality that would make it possible to save it for 
future use. Though the foregoing definitions may preclude rights, 
services, and usufructs from being considered as commodities that 
can be owned, the majority of jurists contend that rights, services and 
usufructs can potentially form the subject matter of valid sale 
                                                                
22 Steven D. Jamar, “The Protection of Intellectual Property under Islamic Law,” 
Capital University Law Review 21 (1992): 1079–1106. 
23 Abdullah Ahmad Ibn Qudamah, Al-Mughni (Cairo: Maktabah al-Kaherah, 1968). 
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contracts and can be owned as commodities. The reason behind the 
argument of the majority of the jurists is that in any commodity, the 
only thing desirable is the usufruct or utilitarian value derivable from 
such a physical object.24 This might be one of the justifications for 
some modern Sharī‘ah scholars who argue that the legal and 
beneficial ownership conundrum does not affect the sharī‘ah validity 
of the ṣukūk transaction. The very nature of beneficial ownership 
under the common law and equity confers all economic benefits on 
the beneficial owner which generally includes the right to the income 
accruing from the property and proceeds of sale or a share of such 
income or proceeds. 25  Subject to some variations in local 
legislations, beneficial ownership generally entails ultimate economic 
ownership of the property. 
2.2  Property Ownership Rights and Ḥaqq al-Ikhtiṣāṣ  
In conceptualizing the nature of rights under the modern legal 
systems, particularly the English legal system, it is pertinent to 
examine some distinction Muslim jurists have made in issues relating 
to ownership or quasi-ownership. This has led to a concept known as 
ḥaqq al-ikhtiṣāṣ in Islamic law which simply represents the right of 
lien which is generally by operation of law. In respect of a property 
and its ownership, the right of lien is often expressed as thubita 
alayhā ḥaqq ikhtiṣāṣ which means a property on which a lien has 
been established against it. Before distinguishing between manfa‘ah 
(usufruct) in a property and ḥaqq al-ikhtiṣāṣ, it may be appropriate to 
clearly define what a legal lien on a property connotes. The Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines a lien as: “A qualified right of property 
which a creditor has in or over [a] specific property of his debtor, as 
security for the debt or charge or for performance of some act. In 
every ease in which property, either real or personal, is charged with 
the payment of a debt or duty, every such charge may be 
                                                                
24 Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, Dr. Wahbah Al-Zuhayli’s Al-Fiqh Al-Islam Wa Adillatuh 
(Islamic Jurisprudence and Its Proofs): Financial Transactions in Islamic 
Jurisprudence (Vol. 1), ed. M. S. Eissa (Damascus: Dar Al-Fikr, 2001), 5–6. 
25 David J. Bederman, “Beneficial Ownership of International Claims,” 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 38, no. 4 (1989): 935–46. 
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denominated a lien on the property”.26 Such a right in form of a 
charge on the underlying property operates as a security for the 
discharge of the debt through repayment. 
In Islamic jurisprudence, ḥaqq al-ikhtiṣāṣ is a right which a 
person has when a specified place is identified with him in a market, 
especially where such a person transacts his normal business. In such 
a situation, such a place becomes unique to him to the exclusion of 
any other person, and no other person will therefore be allowed to 
subsequently occupy the place. This traditional definition of ḥaqq 
al-ikhtiṣāṣ in Islamic jurisprudence gives a rather different meaning 
from the legal definition of lien given above. It therefore appears that 
ḥaqq al-ikhtiṣāṣ in traditional Islamic jurisprudence is conceptualized 
as a right of exclusivity rather than that which may ultimately lead to 
ownership in some special circumstances. Rather than using the term 
“lien” for ḥaqq al-ikhtiṣāṣ, one may prefer the term “exclusive 
appropriation” as used by Kamali.27 The use of the term “ikhtiṣāṣ” 
from the perspective of an exclusive right in property ownership is 
derived from al-Darīnī’s definition of ḥaqq. 28  Al-Darīnī defines 
ikhtiṣāṣ as “an exclusive appropriation or power over something or a 
demand addressed to another party which the sharī‘ah has validated 
in order to realize a certain benefit”.29 Such an exclusive right to the 
property may include the right of easement, beneficial right to use, 
legal right to claim ownership against anybody, and right to prevent 
any interference to the property through the judicial process. From an 
initial consideration, this form of ownership may not be appropriate 
for the structuring of ṣukūk. However, a closer look reveals the 
possibility of relying on this concept in structuring ṣukūk al-ijārah – 
the most prevalent form of sovereign ṣukūk. A further validation of 
                                                                
26 Bryan A. Garner and Henry Campbell Black, Black’s Law Dictionary (St. Paul, 
MN: Thomson/West, 2004). 
27 Mohammad Hashim Kamali, “Fundamental Rights of the Individual: An Analysis 
of Haqq (right) in Islamic Law,” The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 
10, no. 3 (1993): 345. 
28  Fathi Al-Darīnī, Al-Haqq Wa Mada Sultan Al Dawlah, 3rd ed. (Beirut: 
Mu’assasat al-Risalah, 1984). 
29 Cited in Kamali, “Fundamental Rights of the Individual: An Analysis of Haqq 
(right) in Islamic Law,” 345. 
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this preliminary conclusion might be necessary when both Sharī‘ah 
and legal scholars jointly explore the potentials of the concept.  
2.3  Legal Issues in Ṣukūk in Islamic finance 
Unlike the literature on the nature of ownership in Islamic law, when 
it comes to legal issues in ṣukūk within the context of Islamic 
finance, there are few authoritative sources due to the dearth of 
expertise in core legal issues. Some of the existing studies which 
claim to analyze legal issues in actual fact do not really delve into the 
legal dynamics underpinning the ṣukūk transactions. Nevertheless, 
the related literatures are increasing by the day and most of them 
have some elements of law in them, even though they are not 
originally legally oriented.30 In this section, the focus will be on the 
following legal issues: legal and regulatory framework for ṣukūk, 
structure of the ṣukūk transaction, the status of the Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV), contract enforceability, dispute resolution, and 
bankruptcy issues.  
Although not all ṣukūk issuance are cross-border transactions, 
most of the major ṣukūk issuances are usually cross-border where 
there is less or informal regulation which subjects the entire 
transaction to the laws of several jurisdictions that are connected to 
the transaction. From the Sharī‘ah perspective, the entire transaction 
in cross-border ṣukūk is often subject to the endorsement of the ad 
hoc Sharī‘ah advisors appointed to review all the contractual 
documents used in ṣukūk issuance. Nazar explores the compatibility 
of ṣukūk structuring with objectives of Islamic finance and 
economics considering a number of legal and regulatory aspects.31 
                                                                
30 For instance, some of the most recent works on ṣukūk include: Rafisah Mat Radzi 
and Mervyn K. Lewis, “Religion and the Clash of ‘Ideals’ and ‘Realities’ in 
Business: The Case of Islamic Bonds (Sukuk),” Thunderbird International Business 
Review 57, no. 4 (2015): 295–310; Maram Ahmed, “Islamic Project Finance: A Case 
Study of the East Cameron Project,” The Journal of Structured Finance 20, no. 4 
(2015): 120–35; Essia Ries Ahmed, Md Aminul Islam, and Ku Halim Ku Ariffin, 
“An Empirical Analysis on Legitimacy of Sukuk: An Insight of Malaysian Sukuk,” 
Asian Social Science 11, no. 13 (2015): 84–97; Abdul Gahfar Ismail, “Public Private 
Partnerships: Lesson from Sukuk,” IRTI Working Paper Series, 1435-04 (Jeddah, 
2013). 
31 Jhordy Kashoogie Nazar, “Regulatory and Financial Implications of Sukuk’s 
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The study identifies the fluid legal framework in some of the leading 
Arab countries where the underlying properties of the ṣukūk 
structures are located. This creates the challenge of enforceability as 
clearly identified by McMillen where he argued that there are still 
some challenges which need to be addressed in relation to “whether 
and to what extent the Shari'ah or Shari'ah-compliant transactions 
can be enforced in jurisdictions in which the Shari'ah is not 
incorporated to any extent in the secular law of the land (“purely 
secular jurisdictions”), as well as in jurisdictions in which the 
Shari'ah is incorporated to some extent in the secular law of the land 
(“Shari'ah-incorporated jurisdictions”).” 32  It goes without saying 
that issues relating to enforceability lead to the question of the origin 
of the legal systems, particularly those in the GCC region which have 
been largely influenced by different major world legal systems from 
the colonial era up to date.33 
From the perspective of ṣukūk structuring and the extent of 
innovation within the global Islamic finance industry, Wilson 
identifies a number of legal and related financial innovation 
challenges and concludes that “Islamic scholars have shown their 
willingness to apply the principles of ijtihad or legal adaptation to the 
ṣukūk now being traded, but the finance specialists have arguably 
failed the industry to date.34 In financial terms the current ṣukūk 
offerings simply mirror their conventional equivalents”.35 To a large 
extent this argument is valid, and on top of that, the lawyers who 
prepare the ṣukūk documentation have not helped matters. The legal 
specialists are the cause of the current predicaments in which the 
ṣukūk industry finds itself. This has led to a series of defaults in the 
industry and triggered some challenges on how such defaults or near 
                                                                                                                                        
Legal Challenges for Sustainable Sukuk Development in Islamic Capital Market,” in 
8th International Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance (Doha: IAIE & 
IRTI, 2011). 
32 Michael J T Mcmillen, “Contractual Enforceability Issues: Ṣukūk and Capital 
Markets Development,” Chi J Intl L 7, no. 2 (2006): 432. 
33 Jody Waugh and Ahmad Al Awamleh, “Recognition and Enforcement of Islamic 
Finance in the Middle East,” Business Law International 15, no. 1 (2014): 35–44. 
34 Rodney Wilson, “Innovation in the Structuring of Islamic Sukuk Securities,” 
Humanomics 24, no. 3 (2008): 170–81. 
35 Ibid., 180. 
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defaults could be properly managed. 36  The rights of the ṣukūk 
holders are not also protected as a result of the foreign legal 
principles applied to the ṣukūk structures which tend to be 
contradicting in some situations.37 This is why preference is often 
given to legal compliance than to Sharī‘ah compliance in structuring 
ṣukūk in most jurisdictions. As argued by Abdel-Khaleq & 
Richardson, even though the overall structure of ṣukūk should 
ordinarily be Sharī‘ah-compliant, “opinions of local counsel are 
more likely to focus on the effectiveness and validity of the 
transaction documents under the civil code and other relevant 
regulations than on their compliance with Shari`ah”.38 This is the 
reality in the industry in the modern ṣukūk market which calls for 
some reforms in the way and manner some of the products are 
structured. Nevertheless, one must also bear in mind that Islamic 
finance and its various products and indeed the Islamic finance 
industry as a whole does not operate outside the current legal and 
financial framework; hence, the industry is expected to comply with 
the legal and financial principles of the conventional framework 
which may sometimes be alien to the original objective of Islamic 
finance and economics.39  
2.4 Ownership and Sovereign Ṣukūk: Remedies Available to 
Ṣukūk Holders 
Some of the underlying problems faced by the modern ṣukūk market 
include issues relating to ownership and whether there has been 
actual true sale. Ownership is important because it determines the 
way and manner other principles relating to the underlying property 
will be applied in the event of default or even at the end of the tenor. 
                                                                
36 A. Oseni, “Dispute Management in Islamic Financial Institutions: A Case Study 
of near Sukuk Defaults.” 
37 Umar a Oseni and M Kabir Hassan, “Regulating the Governing Law Clauses in 
Sukuk Transactions,” Journal of Banking Regulation 16, no. 3 (2015): 220–49. 
38 Ayman H Abdel-Khaleq and Christopher F Richardson, “New Horizons for 
Islamic Securities: Emerging Trends in Sukuk Offerings,” Chicago Journal of 
International Law 7, no. 2 (2007): 416. 
39 Umar A. Oseni, “Towards Restructuring the Legal Framework for Payment 
System in International Islamic Trade Finance,” Journal of International Trade Law 
and Policy 12, no. 2 (2013): 108–29. 
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This brings to bear the question of ownership in both asset-backed 
and asset-based ṣukūk. Initially, in the Islamic Financial Services 
Board’s Capital Adequacy Standard (IFSB-2), two broad categories 
of ṣukūk were identified namely, asset-based ṣukūk 40  and 
equity-based ṣukūk41. IFSB recognizes the nature of complete or total 
ownership conferred on the ṣukūk holders as evident in Islamic law.42 
This presupposes that “the ṣukūk holders assume all rights and 
obligation attached to the asset” as argued by Dusuki & Mokhtar.43 
This theoretical presumption does not reflect the actual practice in the 
ṣukūk market since most of the ṣukūk structures do not reflect true 
ownership on the part of the ṣukūk holders as required under the 
Sharī‘ah. To address this challenge, IFSB released its Guidelines on 
Capital Adequacy Requirement for Ṣukūk, Securitisations and Real 
Estate Investment (IFSB-7). IFSB-7 introduced a new framework 
which categorized ṣukūk structures into three main categories. These 
are asset-backed structure, pay-through ṣukūk structure, and 
pass-through ṣukūk structure. While the first category is obviously 
the asset-backed type, the last two categories are asset-based ṣukūk 
structures.44 
Despite the new categorization of the ṣukūk structures, one 
may still wonder whether the new framework has helped to solve the 
ownership conundrum which is fundamental in the overall ṣukūk 
arrangement. One may recall that by late 2007 when Shaykh Taqi 
Usmani criticized the way and manner ṣukūk products were being 
issued, where he maintained that over 85% of the ṣukūk traded in the 
                                                                
40 This is the type of ṣukūk where “the underlying assets offer fairly predictable 
returns to the sukūk holders, such as in the case of salam, istisnā’a and ijārah.” 
(IFSB, 2005). 
41 This is the type of ṣukūk where “the returns are determined on a profit and loss 
sharing in the underlying investment, which does not offer fairly predictable returns 
(e.g. mushārakah or mudārabah for trading purposes)”. (IFSB, 2005). 
42 Islamic Financial Services Board, “Guiding Principles for Corporate Governance 
for Institutions Offering Only Islamic Financial Services (Excluding Islamic 
Insurance (Takaful) Institutions and Islamic Mutual Funds)” (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB), 2005). 
43 Asyraf Wajdi Dusuki and Shabnam Mokhtar, “Critical Appraisal of Shari’ah 
Issues on Ownership in Asset-Based Ṣukūk as Implemented in the Islamic Debt 
Market.,” ISRA Research Paper, No. 8/2010, 2010. 
44 Ibid. 
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Islamic finance industry were not Sharī‘ah-compliant,45 there was an 
immeidate response from the Accounting and Auditing Organisation 
for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) which issued new 
guidelines on ṣukūk. One of the major areas identified in the 2008 
guidelines relate to ownership. Usmani in his widely quoted 
statement advised that “Ṣukūk should be issued for new commercial 
and industrial ventures. If they are issued for established businesses, 
then the Ṣukūk must ensure that Ṣukūk holders have complete 
ownership in real assets.”46 
Consequently, in the 2008 AAOIFI guidelines, it was 
emphasized that “Ṣukūk, to be tradable, must be owned by Ṣukūk 
holders, with all rights and obligations of ownership, in real assets, 
whether tangible, usufructs or services, capable of being owned and 
sold legally as well as in accordance with the rules of Shari'ah ... The 
Manager issuing Ṣukūk must certify the transfer of ownership of such 
assets in its (Ṣukūk) books, and must not keep them as his own 
assets”.47 It is however unfortunate to observe that even in the 
post-2008 period, there has not been much changes in the way the 
ṣukūk are structured.48 In a study on the effect of the criticism on the 
structuring of ṣukūk before and after the AAOIFI pronouncement 
with particular reference to controversial issues such as transfer of 
ownership, pricing and guarantee element, it found that there were 
insignificant changes and concluded that the pronoucement did not 
have much effect on the industry,49 hence, the need to re-examine 
the dynamics of legal and beneficial ownership in ṣukūk while 
focusing solely on sovereign ṣukūk.  
                                                                
45 Muhammad Taqi Usmani, “Sukuk and Their Contemporary Applications,” in 
AAOIFI Shari’a Council Meeting, Manama, Translated from the Original Arabic by 
Sheikh Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo (Manama, Bahrain: AAOIFI, 2007). 
46 Ibid., 14. 
47  Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions, 
Al-Ma’ayir Al-Shar’iyyah (Sharī‘ah Standards) (Manama, Bahrain: AAOIFI, 2014). 
48  Saad Azmat, Michael Skully, and Kym Brown, “The Shariah Compliance 
Challenge in Islamic Bond Markets,” Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 28 (2014): 47–
57. 
49 Asmadi Mohamed Naim, “The Effects of New AAOIFI Standards on Sukuk in 
Choosing the Most Authentic Islamic Principles,” Journal of Islamic Accounting and 
Business Research 4, no. 1 (2013): 77–93. 
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3.  LEGAL AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP: COMMON 
LAW, CIVIL LAW AND ISLAMIC LAW COMPARED 
For a better understanding of the dynamics of legal and beneficial 
ownership and how these concepts come into play in the structuring 
of ṣukūk, it might be necessary to provide a general background of 
legal and beneficial rights, and how they are established in the law of 
trust. This section also examines the civil law traditions whether a 
concept as that of a trust is available. Such analyses will be 
juxtaposed with the Islamic legal traditions on ownership which 
might be different from the other two presumably dominant legal 
systems. 
3.1  Common Law 
The origin of the commonly used structure in ṣukūk structuring where 
legal right is conferred on the trustee and the beneficial right is given 
to the ṣukūk holders is a core common law concept generally known 
as trust. In order to establish a working definition for trust, this study 
adopts the definition provided in the Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition of 1985 (Trust 
Convention) which is relevant to ṣukūk, particularly when it is 
structured as a cross-border product. Article 2 of the Trust 
Convention defines trust as the legal relationships created – inter 
vivos or on death – by a person, the settlor, when assets have been 
placed under the control of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary or 
for a specified purpose. This definition is similar to the definition 
given by Oerton who defines trust as: 
.. an equitable obligation binding a person (who is called 
a trustee) to deal with property over which he has 
control (which is called the trust property), for the 
benefit of persons (who are called beneficiary or cestui 
que trust), of whom he may himself be one, and any one 
of whom may enforce the obligation. Any act or neglect 
on the part of a trustee which is not authorised or 
excused by the terms of the trust instrument, or by law, 
is called a breach of trust.50 
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The above definitions may be contextualized within the 
purview of ṣukūk to understand the application of English trust law in 
the Islamic finance industry. One of the key Transaction Documents 
in legal documentation for ṣukūk is the Declaration of Trust. Others 
may include Agency Agreement; Deed of Covenant; Head Lease; 
Procurement Undertaking; Purchase Undertaking; Servicing Agency 
Agreement; Sublease; and Surrender Undertaking, depending on the 
mode of financing used in structuring the ṣukūk. The Transaction 
Documents mentioned above are typically used for the ṣukūk 
al-ijārah structure and were specifically used in the recent HM 
Treasury UK Sovereign Ṣukūk PLC. issued on June 30, 2014. 
Article 2 of the Trust Convention identifies the following 
characteristics of a trust: first, the assets constitute a separate fund 
and are not a part of the trustee's own estate; second, title to the trust 
assets must stand in the name of the trustee or in the name of another 
person on behalf of the trustee; and third, the trustee has the power 
and the duty, in respect of which he is accountable, to manage, 
employ or dispose of the assets in accordance with the terms of the 
trust and the special duties imposed upon him by law. These three 
characteristics might not successfully pass the litmus test of Sharī‘ah 
compliance. For instance, the trustee has the power to dispose of the 
assets if the terms of the trust permit that. This creates a problem of 
ownership particularly in asset-backed ṣukūk and further raises the 
question of true ownership. It is trite under the common law and 
Islamic law that one cannot validly sell that which does not belong to 
someone.51 A valid title in an asset is passed to a bona fide purchaser 
                                                                                                                                        
Butterworths, 1970), 3; David Hayton, Paul Matthews, and Charles Mitchell, 
Underhill and Hayton: Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees, 18th ed. (London: 
LexisNexis, 2010). 
51 In Islamic law, a general principle which is based on the hadith literature is: lā 
tabīḥ mā laisa ‘indak (You cannot vend what you do not own). For a general 
analysis of this principle, see Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Islamic Commercial 
Law: An Analysis of Futures and Options (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2000). 
In common law, a Roman maxim in sales of goods provides: nemo dat quo non 
habet (No one can convey what he does not own). For a detailed analysis of this 
maxim, see Andrew P. Bell, Modern Law of Personal Property in England and 
Ireland (London: Butterworths, 1989); Richard A. Epstein, “Notice and Freedom of 
Contract in the Law of Servitudes,” S. Cal. L. Rev. 55 (1981): 1353–68; Edward M. 
Swartz, “The Bona Fide Purchaser Revisited: A Comparative Inquiry,” Boston 
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for value when the seller is conferred with the ownership rights in the 
asset. Even if one concedes that Sharī‘ah scholars have permitted the 
English law categorization of legal right and beneficial right as the 
hallmarks of trust law to govern ṣukūk transactions due to the fact 
that the entire Islamic finance products should ordinarily comply 
with existing legislations, this aspect requires further scrutiny 
because it touches on a fundamental principle of Sharī‘ah. A spot-on 
solution to the power to sell conferred on the trustee is to restrict such 
powers through the trust instrument as provided by section 9 of the 
English Trustee Act 2000. In fact, some Trust legislations in some 
common law jurisdictions across the world expressly provide for the 
power of the trustee to sell a trust asset. For instance, section 17 of 
the Malaysian Trustee Act of 1949 (Act 208) provides that “No sale 
made by a trustee shall be impeached by any beneficiary upon the 
ground that any of the conditions subject to which the sale was made 
may have been unnecessarily depreciatory, unless it also appears that 
the consideration for the sale was rendered inadequate.”52 
3.2  Civil Law 
Under the civil law mostly applicable in continental Europe, the trust 
law as conceptualized under the common law is not recognized. One 
may therefore revisit the debate whether there is room for English 
law of trust in the civil legal regime. A similar concept is introduced 
in some civil law jurisdictions such as France. The fiducie concept 
was introduced under Chapter 14 of the French Civil Code in 2007. 
This concept is based on the Roman law concept of fiducia which 
draws significantly from similar institutions from other civil law 
jurisdictions and of course, the English trust law (Emerich, 2009). 
Article 2011 of the French Civil Code of 2007 defines fudicie as “a 
contract according to which a settlor transfers all or part of its assets, 
rights or securities to a fiduciary that, in maintaining them separately 
from its own patrimoine, acts according to a specific objective for the 
benefit of its beneficiaries or the settlor itself”.53 This structure does 
                                                                                                                                        
University Law Review 42, no. 4 (1962): 403. 
52 Emphasis added. 
53 Valerio Forti, “Comparing American Trust and French Fiducie,” Colum. J. Eur. 
L. Online 17 (2011): 32. 
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not really represent the kind of ownership anticipated in ṣukūk from 
the Islamic law perspective and has not been used for ṣukūk 
structuring generally. In fact, there was a move to modify the fiducie 
concept in 2009, but the move was struck down by the Constitutional 
Council on procedural grounds. 54  This development is well 
articulated by Koessler: 
 
In 2009, a legislative proposal was put forward to 
change the fiducie in order to accommodate Islamic 
finance and to allow the creation of ṣukūks under French 
law (one of the requirements being that the person in 
possession of a ṣukūk must have a property right in the 
underlying asset). This was fairly unproblematic in 
England, where a trust is used and the possessor of the 
ṣukūk instrument is granted equitable ownership over 
the assets. Article 16 of the law would have modified 
the fiducie so as to create a property right for the benefit 
of the beneficiary (a so-called ‘economic property 
right’), which is distinct from the ‘legal property’.55 
 
One may argue that even though the French Constitutional 
Council struck down the proposal, it was a blessing in disguise as the 
fiducie model or its modified version which would have be similar to 
the English trust law would not have mirrored the true ownership 
rights recognized under the Sharī‘ah.  
3.3  Different Concepts, Different Principles: Is There Any 
Prospects for Harmonization? 
As demonstrated above, the common law and civil law concepts of 
ownership are not the same, as there are significant differences in the 
nature of ownership conferred on the investors. From the onset, it is 
important to clarify that when it comes to the ownership of a 
                                                                
54 Décision no. 2009-589 DC du 14 Oct. 2009 [Constitutional Council] as cited in 
James Koessler, “Is There Room for the Trust in a Civil Law System? The French 
and Italian Perspectives,” SSRN, 2012, 10, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2132074 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2132074. 
55 Ibid., 9. 
THE LEGAL AND BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP CONUNDRUM IN SOVEREIGN ṢUKŪK 
129 
property, common law allows a person to be the legal owner of a 
property, while at the same time conferring on another the beneficial 
(equitable) ownership of the same property. On the other hand, civil 
law does not recognize this dual ownership but there is a gradual 
move towards convergence and harmonization of laws in some 
jurisdictions in Europe and some political entities in North America 
such as Louisiana.56 Nevertheless, it is always believed that “English 
law does not readily fit into civilian pigeon-holes ...it does not follow 
that a system which has the trust must have an English pigeon-hole 
for it.”57 This may also be true for the discussion on ownership in 
Islamic law vis-à-vis its application under a civil or English legal 
system. Islamic law concepts do not perfectly fit into the English or 
civil pigeon-holes, as concepts such as ownership of property and 
securitization are based on different underlying principles.  
There are a number of civil law-inspired legal systems in the 
Arab world where Islamic financial services and products are 
booming. And on top of that, most transactions in such jurisdictions 
such as UAE and Bahrain are structured in common law fashion 
since the majority of the solicitors handling mega ṣukūk projects are 
English law firms. 58  It is therefore evident that the practical 
application of Islamic finance has not only provided for convergence 
in the financial system59, but it has also provided an uncommon 
avenue or a rare opportunity for convergence of laws between the 
three major world legal systems.  
  
                                                                
56 Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, “In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Fertile 
Areas for Litigation,” Southwestern Law Journal 35, no. 5 (1982): 973–1011. 
57 Gretton, “Trust and Patrimony,” 182. 
58 Waugh and Awamleh, “Recognition and Enforcement of Islamic Finance in the 
Middle East.” 
59 Ibrahim Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2000), 81. 
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4.  SOVEREIGN ṢUKŪK: BETWEEN ASSET-BASED AND 
ASSET-BACKED ṢUKŪK 
4.1  Revisiting the Different Types of Ṣukūk Structures 
From the very early period when the earliest ṣukūk were structured, 
the differences between asset-based and asset-backed ṣukūk have 
generated controversy among the major stakeholders in the Islamic 
finance industry such as the Sharī‘ah scholars, lawyers, economists, 
finance experts, and of course the Islamic finance academics who 
sometimes analyze things from different prisms. The general practice 
is that when the ṣukūk issuance is asset-based, the investors only have 
beneficial ownership in the underlying asset while asset-backed 
ṣukūk confers on the investors full legal ownership. 
 
It must be remembered that asset-based structures were 
created due to market pressure and competition as well 
as legal constraints ... such as the inalienability of 
property to foreigners in most Gulf jurisdictions. 
Asset-based Ṣukūk are a viable financing solution for 
corporations and banks who are unwilling to dispose of 
their physical assets by way of true sale to an SPV, inter 
alia due to risk management considerations. From an 
investor’s perspective, asset-based Ṣukūk is a Sharia 
compliant alternative to bonds. The Ṣukūk holder 
generally has no asset risk but credit risk.60 
 
The popular categorization of ṣukūk to asset-based and 
asset-backed has been extended by IFBS-7 which provides three 
distinct legal structures of ṣukūk. These are an asset-backed ṣukūk 
structure, an asset-based ṣukūk structure, and a “pass-through” 
asset-based ṣukūk structure.61 For the first category, since the major 
                                                                
60 Osman Sacarcelik, “Overcoming the Divergence Gap Between Applicable State 
Law and Sharia Principles: Enhancing Clarity, Predictability and Enforceability in 
Islamic Finance TransactionsWithin Secular Jurisdictions,” in 8th International 
Conference on Islamic Economics and Finance (Doha: IAIE & IRTI, 2011), 2. 
61 Islamic Financial Services Board, “Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB)’s 
Capital Adequacy Standard for Institutions (Other than Insurance Institutions) 
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risk involved relates to the underlying asset, the ṣukūk holders bear 
the risk, as they are considered the owners of the asset. For the 
second category, which is asset-based, no true ownership is passed to 
the ṣukūk holders. The major risk involved is credit risk. In the 
asset-based structure, subject to the prevailing legal framework, 
beneficial ownership rights conferred on the ṣukūk holders will not 
result in a right of possession in the event of a default, but a right of 
recourse against the originator.62 This is similar to the “asset-based 
priority credit system” in secured transaction law under the 
conventional financing system.63 
Legal uncertainties subsist in different jurisdictions across the 
world, and this has tremendously affected the structure of some of the 
ṣukūk products and the respective rights of major stakeholders in any 
issuance. The nature and structure of the Special Purpose Vehicle or 
Entity (SPV or SPE) might be different under different legal systems. 
For instance, in some jurisdictions, including in those countries 
where some ṣukūk have been issued previously, “there may be legal 
obstacles to setting up an appropriate type of SPE which can meet the 
conditions for the fiduciary responsibilities mentioned above. In such 
legal environments, it may not be possible to transfer beneficial title 
in the assets to the investors or to ensure that the investors are able to 
exercise these rights (for example, to repossess ijārah assets) in case 
of default. In such cases, it is not feasible to create a structure for 
issuing non-recourse asset-backed securities (ABS)”.64 There is no 
doubt that ownership is essential in such structuring. So, when the 
investors are not, or cannot, exercise such right of recourse in 
asset-backed ṣukūk, the implication of that is that they were not the 
original true owners of the asset. Therefore, the right of recourse 
would enhance the ownership right of the ṣukūk holders; hence, such 
may be tantamount to the true ownership envisaged in Islamic law. 
                                                                                                                                        
Offering Only Islamic Financial Services” (Kuala Lumpur, 2009). 
62 Ibid., 7. 
63 Yoram Keinan, “The Evolution of Secured Transactions,” University of Michigan 
Law School Working Paper (Michigan, 2000). 
64 Islamic Financial Services Board, “Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB)’s 
Capital Adequacy Standard for Institutions (Other than Insurance Institutions) 
Offering Only Islamic Financial Services,” 4. 
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4.2 Protection in the Event of Default: What Structure is Best for 
the Investors? 
In order to determine what structure is more suited to the interest of 
the investors, a number of issues need to be closely examined. A 
reference to the AAOIFI standards on ṣukūk and the 2008 guidelines 
reflects a desired level of awareness among investors who are now 
exposed to the different types of ṣukūk structures. It thus appears that 
AAOIFI gives preference for equity-based structures such as ṣukūk 
al-mushārakah and ṣukūk al-muḍārabah in order to distinguish ṣukūk 
from the conventional bond which is nothing, but a debt. The purpose 
of such a suggestion is to protect the rights of the investors while 
ensuring compliance with the Sharī‘ah. Similar protection is 
available in asset-backed ṣukūk structure where investors are duly 
protected in the event of a default, as they can have recourse to the 
underlying asset. This was clearly demonstrated in the East Cameron 
Gas Ṣukūk judgment.65 However, some jurisdictions still have some 
restrictions on recourse against assets in their territories. The 
asset-backed ṣukūk structure provides the investors an ownership 
share of the underlying asset which may represent the much desired 
true sale. However, the challenge remains whether the legal title in 
the underlying asset is transferred to the investors or not. 
Nevertheless, it is not a precondition of a valid sale under the 
Sharīʿah to transfer the title through registration once a valid sale has 
been made. It has, however, been argued that asset-based structures 
may be more suitable where it is practically impossible to transfer the 
title of an underlying asset.66 There are some jurisdictions with 
restrictions on foreign ownership of certain classes of assets such as 
real estate. In such situations, an asset-backed ṣukūk structure might 
not be appropriate from practical aspects.  
                                                                
65 Faizal Ahmad Manjoo, “The ‘Ping-Pong’of the Asset Backed/Asset-Based Sukuk 
Debate and the Way Forward,” in Islamic Finance: Issues in Sukuk and Proposals 
for Reform, ed. Mohammad Hashim Kamali and Abdul Karim Abdullah (United 
Kingdom: International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies and the Islamic 
Foundation, 2014), 11–28. 
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In the recent case of In re Certain Funds, Accounts, and/or 
Inv. Vehicles Managed by Affiliates of Fortress Inv. Group LLC, 14 
Civ. 1801 (NRB)67, the petition involved an application to the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York for an ex parte 
order to obtain discovery from the auditors of the SPV which is 
Golden Belt 1 Ṣukūk Company BSC in order to utilize the documents 
in pending international judicial proceedings. Fortress Investment 
Group invested in ṣukūk and held the largest interest in the Golden 
Belt 1 Ṣukūk. Saad Group was the obligor of the ṣukūk transaction 
when the ṣukūk defaulted and could not make periodic payment to 
the ṣukūk holders. Expectedly, the default triggered a number of 
international judicial proceedings. Some such proceedings include a 
Statement of Claim against Saad Trading in the Negotiable 
Instrument Committee of Saudi Arabia. There are also pending 
liquidation and insolvency proceedings in the Cayman Islands and 
Bahrain against the Saad Group. 
For the case before the District Court in New York, the court 
denied the petitioners’ application for discovery of documents based 
on the following reasoning inter alia: 
 
Petitioners also argue that their significant financial 
stake in the GB1 ṣukūk makes them an interested party. 
However, the case they cite in support of this argument 
... dealt with a parent company seeking discovery for aid 
in foreign litigation in which its subsidiary was a party. 
Although petitioners hold twenty percent of the ṣukūk 
certificates, they are not in a parent-subsidiary 
relationship with the party that is actually litigating 
before the Saudi NIC, and their only involvement with 
the case is to “monitor the progress.”68  
 
Though the Golden Belt 1 Ṣukūk Company BSC’s right was merely a 
recourse against the originator and not the underlying asset since the 
ṣukūk was asset-based, it opened the Pandora’s Box of international 
ṣukūk litigation and how the asset-based ṣukūk structure is easily 
                                                                
67 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95578 
68 Ibid. 
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open to abuse which leads to a situation where the courts will merely 
consider the transaction as a conventional bond offering.  
4.3 Sovereign Ṣukūk and the Sale of Publicly-owned Property 
According to the IFIS Database, as of November 9, 2014, a total 
number of 2,277 sovereign ṣukūk were issued by 56 issuers since 
September 20, 2001 when the Government of Bahrain issued the first 
sovereign ṣukūk based on the ṣukūk al-ijārah structure. Within this 
period, the total amount of sovereign ṣukūk alone was US$463 
billion which was about 54.69% of the total amount (US$846 billion) 
of ṣukūk issued since inception. This shows the increasing relevance 
of sovereign ṣukūk in economic and infrastructural development in 
both Muslim-majority countries and western jurisdictions. 69  The 
recent ṣukūk issuances in the UK and Luxembourg and the increasing 
interest in tapping into the Sharī‘ah-compliant funds in the hands of 
Muslim investors support the thesis that there will continue to be 
innovation and adaptation in the global ṣukūk market which makes it 
a point of duty for the stakeholders to ensure things are done in the 
proper way. 
Regardless of the break throughs recorded in the ṣukūk market, 
one may wonder whether some key Sharī‘ah principles are complied 
with when it comes to the transfer of ownership of a publicly-owned 
property to ṣukūk holders in an asset-backed ṣukūk structure of a 
sovereign ṣukūk. When the underlying asset of such sovereign ṣukūk 
is public property such as the piece of land used in the Government 
of Bahrain Ṣukūk of 2001, can such public property be transferred to 
the ṣukūk holders even if there is a binding promise to repurchase the 
property? In the sovereign ṣukūk, part of the Manama Airport (a 
public property) was sold to a Special Purpose Vehicle through a 
Sale and Purchase Contract. There was a trust declaration in the 
underlying asset where the SPV held the asset for the benefit of the 
ṣukūk holders. The ijārah contract contained a promise (undertaking) 
to buy back the underlying and a promise to purchase by the 
Government of Bahrain (the lessee). This prevented any sale to a 
third party. 
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In the hadith regarding common or shared property, the 
Prophet emphasised that “Muslims are partners in three things: water, 
pasture and fire, and their price is unlawful.”70 This implies that 
public property cannot be owned by an individual and may not be 
subject to alienation since it is owned by the entire citizenry and 
managed by the state. Nowadays, natural resources and underground 
treasures (rikāz) may also be considered as underlying assets of ṣukūk 
such as the East Cameron Ṣukūk.71 These might be considered as 
state property which cannot be easily privatized. Military equipment 
may also be regarded as state property which might not easily be 
converted to private property. It is reported that one fifth of military 
equipment captured from the enemies were converted to state 
property. Utilizing such sensitive state assets for sovereign ṣukūk 
might just be a way of circumventing the mandatory provisions of the 
law. In the entire prophetic precedents reported in the hadith 
literature, there are no instances where the Prophet sold or permitted 
the sale of a public land for the purpose of financing public needs. It 
is reported that ‘Umar bin Al-Khattāb once said: “The property and 
fortunes of Bani Al-Nadir were among the riches endowed by Allah, 
the exalted Almighty, to His messenger without any fighting by the 
Muslims. Therefore, those riches were purely at the disposal of the 
messenger of Allah. He separated one year’s provision for his 
household, leaving the rest for covering public expenses and needs, 
especially those related to the military effort in the way of Allah, the 
exalted and the most glorified.” 72  Some of these property and 
fortunes included vast swath of land which were considered public 
property. There is no known record of a direct sale of a state-owned 
land. Hence, it might not be proper to utilize sensitive public property 
                                                                
70 This hadith (No. 2472) is classified as ḍa’if (weak) in hadith literature. However, 
another similar narration provides: “Three things cannot be denied to anyone: water, 
pasture and fire” (Hadith No. 2473). This latter hadith is classified as ṣaḥīḥ (sound) 
hadith. See Muhammad Ibn Majah, English Translation of Sunan Ibn Majah, ed. 
Huda Khattab, trans. Nasiruddin Al-Khattab, vol. 3 (Riyadh: Darussalam 
Publications, 2007), 414–415. 
71 Manjoo, “The ‘Ping-Pong’of the Asset Backed/Asset-Based Sukuk Debate and 
the Way Forward.” 
72 Abu Al-Fida’ Ismail Ibn Kathir, Ibn Al-Sira Al-Nabawiyyah (Vol. 2) (Beirut: Dar 
Al-Fikr, 1978), 153. 
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as the underlying assets for sovereign ṣukūk even if there is a binding 
undertaking to repurchase the asset.  
4.4  Waiver of Immunity for Sovereign Assets: Any Sharī‘ah 
Implication? 
It is common to include a “waiver of immunity” clause in the 
Transaction Documents of sovereign ṣukūk. It is important to add that 
such a clause is not only used in sovereign ṣukūk, it can be used for 
any type of ṣukūk depending on the underlying assets. In the 
landmark decision of the UK Supreme Court in NML Capital Limited 
v. Republic of Argentina,73 the court held that sovereign immunity 
cannot be invoked by states when they are faced with the 
enforcement of an adverse foreign judgment in England in 
commercial cases. This has been the practice when a judgment 
creditor seeks to enforce a judgment against a particular asset 
belonging to a state situated in England in cases involving 
international bond markets. Conversely, in order to protect its foreign 
economic interest and seek reciprocity, it appears the United States 
Supreme Court prefer to adopt strict interpretation to the provision of 
sections 1609 and 1610(a) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
of 1976 (FSIA) which limit execution on property of a foreign state 
to “property ... in the United States ... used for a commercial activity 
in the United States” as held in The Republic of Argentina 
(Petitioner) v NML capital Ltd. (Respondent) 74 . In fact, it was 
revealed in the judgment of the US Court of Appeal in the case that 
Argentina expressly waived any claim to immunity in the main bond 
agreements as held in NML Capital Ltd. v The Republic of 
Argentina 75 . It therefore follows that regardless of whether the 
immunity waiver clause is included in the ṣukūk agreements, it might 
be impossible to have recourse to sovereign assets in some countries 
such as the US, even though the Supreme Court judgment in the 
above case differentiates between “jurisdictional immunity” and 
“execution immunity”. It is the latter which the US FSIA protects 
while the former is often waived.  
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Though the English decisions above are not really be the focus 
of this study, they are, however, relevant in understanding the use of 
certain clauses and the likely interpretation that will be given to them 
in the event of a similar case involving Sharī‘ah-compliant 
transactions. Having said this, one cardinal question to be addressed 
from the Sharī‘ah perspective is whether there is recourse for a 
publicly-owned property of a state which is situated in another state. 
Such property is expected to be public property. So the question that 
arises is similar to the question discussed in the above subsection on 
whether such sovereign property can be sold. A public property is 
utilized for the benefit of the whole public and belongs to all. The US 
Supreme Court emphasized in The Republic of Argentina (Petitioner) 
v NML Capital Ltd. (Respondent) that “It is the sovereign nature of 
the property and its use that gives rise to the immunity in each 
instance, not who raises the immunity claim”. 76 This might be 
relevant in grounding the principle of sovereign immunity in Islamic 
commercial law in general, and the process of structuring sovereign 
ṣukūk products. 
5.  DOES THE SHARĪʿAH RECOGNIZE THE CURRENT 
TRUST MODEL USED IN SOVEREIGN ṢUKŪK? 
It is important to begin with the basic assumption that the nature of 
the prevalent sovereign ṣukūk transactions was not known during the 
early days of Islam, and one cannot simply identify such a practice 
during the period. However, experts have tried to draw some parallels 
which might not perfectly describe the modern complex ṣukūk 
market. It is therefore expedient to examine the views of the major 
stakeholders who have shared their views in earlier studies. However, 
before that, it may be helpful to consider the validity of the Sharīʿah 
of the trust model used in sovereign ṣukūk. In addressing this issue, 
this study relies on the permissibility, or otherwise, of adopting 
foreign legal formants or embarking on a legal transplant in areas not 
generally covered in the Sharīʿah. In his exegesis of the relevant 
legal texts on the imperativeness of adopting a legal system that is 
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based on the Qur’an and sunnah, 77  Imām Muḥammad al-Amīn 
al-Shanqītī clarified the import of the relevant verses. He emphasized 
that not all man-made systems contradict the Sharīʿah and thus 
divides man-made legal systems into two major categories 
administrative and legislative systems.78 The first category of legal 
formants relates to the administrative system which deals more with 
legal rules, laws, and institutions put in place to ensure that society 
and transactions undertaken by people are done in an orderly manner 
without violating any Sharīʿah principle. Such legal innovations, 
even though, some might have been borrowed from foreign legal 
                                                                
77 Some of the legal texts in the Qur’an on this subject matter include the following 
verses [Translation of Sahih International]:  
Qur’an 10:59: “Say, "Have you seen what Allah has sent down to you of provision 
of which you have made [some] lawful and [some] unlawful?" Say, "Has Allah 
permitted you [to do so], or do you invent [something] about Allah?"” 
Qur’an 5: 48: “And We have revealed to you, [O Muhammad], the Book in truth, 
confirming that which preceded it of the Scripture and as a criterion over it. So judge 
between them by what Allah has revealed and do not follow their inclinations away 
from what has come to you of the truth. To each of you We prescribed a law and a 
method. Had Allah willed, He would have made you one nation [united in religion], 
but [He intended] to test you in what He has given you; so race to [all that is] good. 
To Allah is your return all together, and He will [then] inform you concerning that 
over which you used to differ.” 
Qur’an 5: 49: “And judge, [O Muhammad], between them by what Allah has 
revealed and do not follow their inclinations and beware of them, lest they tempt you 
away from some of what Allah has revealed to you. And if they turn away - then 
know that Allah only intends to afflict them with some of their [own] sins. And 
indeed, many among the people are defiantly disobedient.” 
Qur’an 5: 50: “Then is it the judgement of [the time of] ignorance they desire? But 
who is better than Allah in judgement for a people who are certain [in faith].” 
Qur’an: 4:60: “Have you not seen those who claim to have believed in what was 
revealed to you, [O Muhammad], and what was revealed before you? They wish to 
refer legislation to Taghut, while they were commanded to reject it; and Satan 
wishes to lead them far astray.” 
Qur’an 4: 65: “But no, by your Lord, they will not [truly] believe until they make 
you, [O Muhammad], judge concerning that over which they dispute among 
themselves and then find within themselves no discomfort from what you have 
judged and submit in [full, willing] submission.” 
78 Muḥammad al-Amīn Al-Shanqītī, Aḍwā’u Al-Bayān Fī īḍāḥī Al-Qur’ān Bi Al- 
Qur’ān, ed. Bakr Abdullah Abu Zaid, vol. 4 (Jeddah: Dar al-Alam Al-Fawa’id li 
al-Nashr wa al-Tawzi', n.d.), 109. 
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systems, are considered as part of the promotion of general public 
interest (maṣlaḥah āmah).79 In this regard, one may argue that the 
SPV structure which is bankruptcy remote and the trust model are 
meant to facilitate and guarantee the investments of the ṣukūk 
holders. These are part of the administrative issues that need to be 
regulated which do not necessarily contradict the Sharīʿah. On the 
other hand, the second category constitutes the legislative systems 
where laws are made to contradict clear-cut Sharīʿah provisions such 
as laws promoting ribā.80 This second category is what is referred to 
in the verses in the Qur’an which is beyond the scope of this study. 
Though this study has given some likely indications on the 
validity of the current practice of declaration of trust in sovereign 
ṣukūk in the eyes of the Sharī‘ah, there is a need for further 
exploration of the issue. Although Sharī‘ah principles for ensuring a 
“true sale” in a typical ṣukūk transaction is necessary, the general 
operations of a special purpose vehicle established for the purpose of 
a particular ṣukūk is generally regulated by common law principles. 
With the Torrens system of land registration operational in some 
common law jurisdictions like Malaysia, Australia, Canada, and 
Singapore, where land ownership can only be transferred through the 
registration of title, the issue of true ownership is further 
complicated.81  
The thin line between the legal and beneficial ownership rights 
created in a trust declaration relates to the simultaneous rights of the 
parties over the underlying property. While the trustee’s rights over 
the property are considered as rights in rem (enforceable against all 
third parties), the beneficiaries, i.e., ṣukūk holders, hold the beneficial 
ownership rights over the property, and as such, their rights are 
enforceable against the legal owner or trustee as rights in personam. 
The influence of the Torrens system of registration of land title 
requires that when the underlying property in the ṣukūk transaction is 
a registrable property, i.e., land holdings or real property, the legal 
ownership in such property will be conferred on the trustee by virtue 
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81 Theodore BF Ruoff, An Englishman Looks at the Torrens System (Sydney: Law 
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of registration of title to such land. However, the beneficial 
ownership conferred on the ṣukūk holders is by virtue of the 
declaration of trust in the Subscription Agreement.  
Thus, generally, beneficial ownership is also known as 
equitable ownership since the former was introduced in the Courts of 
Equity to mitigate the hardship of common law. The Chancellor of 
the Court of Chancery in medieval England invoked its equitable 
jurisdiction as part of its general administrative powers to provide 
relief for a party that has experienced the hardship of common law. 
Therefore, in order to protect the rights and interests of a person to a 
property, the concept of beneficial ownership was introduced by the 
Court of Chancery through a trust obligation. Hence, when a property 
is sold to a buyer, the seller holds the property on trust for the benefit 
of the buyer who is the beneficiary. So in equity, the beneficial owner 
is the real owner of the property and can enforce his rights over such 
property against the trustee. With this background in mind, the views 
of Sharī‘ah and legal scholars will enrich the discussion on the use of 
the current trust model, particularly in sovereign ṣukūk transactions.  
In a lead paper, Haneef maintained that the concept of trustee 
and ownership were both recognized in the Qur’an and sunnah, and 
as such, there should not be any problem with the adoption of the 
trust model in ṣukūk transactions.82 After reviewing related verses on 
the concept of ownership and trusteeship (khilafah) in Qur’an 4:126, 
67: 15, and 57:7, he concludes that:  
 
1. Sharī‘ah recognizes Allah as the absolute owner of all 
properties and humans merely trustees. 
2. The concept of legal and beneficial ownership (as applied in 
Common Law) is not incompatible with sharī‘ah. 
3. Sharī‘ah also ought to recognize that when a seller sells a 
property, the seller is obliged to hold on trust the property for 
the benefit of the buyer (the beneficiary). The seller becomes a 
                                                                
82 Rafee Haneef, “Legal and Beneficial Ownership - Law Perspective,” in 9th 
International Sharah Scholars Forum Contemporary Issues in the Application of 
Islamic Finance: Beneficial and Legal Ownership and Takaful in Light of Islamic 
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bare trustee, holding the legal title for the beneficial owner (the 
buyer). 
4. To say “Sharī‘ah does not recognize beneficial ownership” is 
contrary to the letter and spirit of Sharī‘ah. 
5. In a mudaraba, the mudarib holds the mudaraba assets on 
trust for the rabb al-mal. 
6. Almost all ṣukūk offering are done through a trust deed, where 
the ṣukūk issuer acts as a trustee for the trust assets (e.g., 
landed assets), and the ṣukūk holders become the beneficiaries 
of the trust assets. Ṣukūk evidences the beneficial ownership of 
the trust assets.83 
 
One additional issue considered is the registration of the trust assets 
in the name of the ṣukūk issuer, particularly in sovereign ṣukūk where 
in most cases the assets are originally public properties. On top of 
that, what about the “real owners”, i.e., the numerous ṣukūk holders 
who are the equitable owners of the assets? Haneef believes there is 
no need to even register the trust assets in the name of the ṣukūk 
issuer because of the increased transaction costs involved in such 
registration which may include, depending on the jurisdiction, stamp 
duty, value added tax, registration fees, property gains taxes, etc.84 
One must bear in mind the unique nature of Islamic finance 
transactions such as ṣukūk. At the end of the maturity date, the 
underlying assets will be transferred back to the originator and such 
transfer of assets goes with the transfer of title and will involve 
similar costs. Therefore, in order to avoid numerous costs which will 
affect the overall pricing of the ṣukūk, and to ensure the principle of 
ḥifz al-māl is upheld in structuring a Sharī‘ah compliant transaction 
that is in line with maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah, the majority of modern 
jurists prefer to not register the trust assets in the name of the issuer.  
Similarly, Elgari agrees with the line of argument above and 
further buttresses his standpoint with a number of proofs from 
Islamic juriprudence and related views expressed by early Muslim 
jurists with regard to the very essence and nature of ownership in 
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Islamic law. 85  First, in Al-Furūq by Al-Qarāfī, the difference 
between the legal maxim on ownership (milk) and the one on legal 
disposition (taṣarruf) is that though the two maxims are quite similar, 
it is possible for a person to own a property without the 
dispositionary rights. For example, someone who is legally 
interdicted (maḥjūr ‘alayhi) or have legal guardianship of children 
may own a property, but not be able legally dispose of it. On the 
other hand, one may be conferred with the dispositionary rights of a 
property without necessarily having the legal ownership of it. For 
example, in the case of the executor of a will, an agent or even a 
judge, there are situations where they are legally empowered to 
dispose off certain properties on behalf of others, even though they 
do not ordinarily legally own such properties. This justifies the trust 
declaration which involves numerous ṣukūk holders and the trustee 
who manages the property on their behalf.86 Second, Elgari further 
argues that in the Islamic jurisprudential rules relating to slavery (fiqh 
al-raqīq), the majority of Muslim jurists agree that when an 
authorized engage in commercial transactions and owns certain 
properties, such properties even when registered in the name of the 
slave, still falls under the general ownership of the master.87  
Third, Elgari further justifies the ṣukūk structure involving a 
trust declaration by the concept of adl (trustee-arbitrator) widely 
recognized by Muslim jurists in rahn (mortgage) contract which is a 
collateral security and enforcement mechanism.88 Such collateral put 
under the custody of a trusted third party is kept as a trust for the 
eligible party, and it serves as a collateral.89 Ibn ‘Arabī contends that 
when such a collateral falls under the custody of the 
                                                                
85 Mohamed Ali Elgari, “Al-Tatbiq Al-Milkiyyah Al-Naf’iyyah Wa Al-Milkiyyah 
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trustee-arbitrator, the mortgage is redeemed literally since the 
trustee-arbitrator represents the rightful party and he merely acts as 
an agent for such a party.90 Fourth, what may be regarded as a 
simulated or pre-emptive sale (bay’ al-talji’ah) is another 
justification of the legal and beneficial ownership structure in a ṣukūk 
transaction. This form of sale is generally fictitious and is 
purposefully meant to serve a specific temporary purpose in order to 
achieve a higher goal. In this kind of transaction, the seller pretends 
to sell a particular commodity while in actual fact nothing was sold. 
This simulated or pre-emptive transaction is often undertaken when 
there is a looming threat to the property which may be as a result of 
seizure by a creditor on the orders of the court or compulsory 
acquisition or confiscation by the state. The Muslim jurists are not 
unanimous as to the legal validity of this kind of transaction. While 
the Shafi’i jurists consider bay’ al-talji’ah as a valid sale, Hanbali 
and Hanafi jurists contend that such a sale is not valid in the eyes of 
the law.91  
From a different angle, Al-Quradāghī dissects the relevant 
issues and identifies similar concepts like ikhtiṣāṣ and goes on to 
specifically address the way modern Islamic banks undertake 
murābaḥah transactions, whether the underlying asset is a real 
property or movable property. 92  The Islamic banks do not 
necessarily register the property in their names first before selling 
such property to the customer. Such property is usually sold to the 
customer and finally registered in his name without any prior 
registration that may increase transaction costs and create 
unnecessary and avoidable difficulties.93 Al-Quradāghī argues that it 
is sufficient to merely sign the Sharī‘ah contract once all essential 
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elements are fulfiled such as offer and acceptance.94 This is to avoid 
unnecessary transaction costs and fees involved in the registration of 
the title to the property when ownership is transferred twice. 
Nevertheless, it is noted that jurisdictions in Malaysia and the United 
Kingdom, etc. have realized this important distinction between 
Islamic bank and conventional bank products and have amended their 
laws accordingly to cater for such specifics of Islamic banking 
products. While such law reforms and procedures are introduced to 
facilitate murābaḥah transactions since ownership changes in a 
matter of a few seconds or minutes, there is still a lingering problem 
as regards ṣukūk transactions. Orginally, the Sharī‘ah would expect 
the ṣukūk holders to hold both the legal and beneficial ownership in 
the underlying asset. Al-Quradāghī, however, concludes that since 
the requirements for complete ownership under the Sharī‘ah are 
present in beneficial ownership with the exception of formal 
registration of the title, the ṣukūk holders can possess beneficial 
ownership of the underlying assets without violating any fundamental 
principle of the Sharī‘ah. In such a situation, he argues that a mere 
legal ownership might still be conferred on the ṣukūk issuer which 
does not in any way affect the validity of the transaction.95  
One fundamental condition which Al-Quradāghī introduces 
into the discourse is the issue of non-registration of the title of the 
underlying asset and its effect on the rights of the ṣukūk holders, 
particularly in the case of an eventual default and right to recourse. 
He argues that if it is assumed non-registration of the title in the 
name of either the issuer or the ṣukūk holders does not contradict the 
validity of the contract legally, there must be a right of recourse 
against third parties and such condition must be stipulated in the 
Ṣukūk Prospectus so that prospective investors will be aware of all 
the circumstances surrounding transactions 96  In addition, if the 
Prospectus provides that the legal ownership does not pass to the 
ṣukūk holders as a result of non-registration of the title to the property 
or it is not known whether such legal title will pass or not, then 
relevant clauses should be included in the Prospectus to the effect 
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that the legal title signifying ownershp passes to the ṣukūk holders in 
accordance to the Sharī‘ah. And even if such clauses are not 
included, the legal title of ownership stands transferred to the ṣukūk 
holders in accordance to the Sharī‘ah.  
6. CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing analysis, one may conclude that the entire 
Islamic financial services industry and the ṣukūk market, in 
particular, are subject to the overbearing legal principles of the legal 
system under which they operate. Different legal systems shape and 
revise the nature of some core principles in Islamic law, particularly 
the nature and extent of ownership.97 To what extent such foreign 
principles might be adopted to ensure Islamic finance products such 
as ṣukūk remain not only Sharī‘ah-compliant, but also economically 
viable and competitive in a polarised global financial system depends 
on the position of sharī‘ah on issues involving adoption of foreign 
legal principles and commercial concepts. The guiding principle 
should be the spirit that propelled the growth of Islamic banking in 
Malaysia in the early period which is well articulated by Ibrahim.98 
While referring to the Islamic banking industry, he contended that 
“where the normal banking practices do not clash with the Islamic 
principles, the Islamic banks have adopted the current banking 
practices and procedures. Where any clash arises, the Islamic banks 
have devised their own practices and procedures to accomplish their 
banking activities”.99 This practice seems to have been extended to 
the Islamic capital markets with special reference to ṣukūk. However, 
with the increasing rate of defaults, it becomes difficult to continue to 
adopt contemporary bond markets and procedures, particularly when 
it has become glaring that most of those preparing the ṣukūk 
documentation and the lead arrangers are products of conventional 
bonds market. 
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The way forward is for the stakeholders in the Islamic 
financial services industry to go back to the drawing board and come 
up with an acceptable model which will not violate core principles of 
sale contracts and transfer of ownership in Islamic law. Though the 
existing SPV model does not contradict the sharīʿah, issues relating 
to ownership may require further considerations. Pricing matters will 
have to be considered, too, in order to come up with not just an 
economically viable model, but also a Sharī‘ah-compliant product 
that will stand the test of time. Issues involving ṣukūk requires a close 
consideration of harmonization of laws and financial principles and 
products where necessary. Based on recent trends, it seems there is 
more focus on raising funds and integration into the global financial 
system, but less concern for Sharī‘ah compliance. As argued by 
Muhammad Al-Amine, even though there is nothing wrong in 
seeking acceptability by international financial institutions, the 
priority of ṣukūk issuers and originators should be Sharī‘ah 
compliant to ensure “the growth of real economy and socio-economic 
development of the society.”100 
This study is timely, as it is comes at a time where some 
stakeholders in the global Islamic finance industry, such as AAOIFI, 
have realized the need to review and revise some controversial 
practices in the industry. The Secretary General of AAOIFI recently 
announced that AAOIFI is “looking at the possibility of developing 
clearer guidance on ṣukūk that will incorporate accounting, legal, 
technical and tax-related aspects.”101 Ṣukūk has been identified as 
one of the four Sharī‘ah standards that will be revised. As a result of 
this study, it is expected that some form of harmonization of laws 
should take place in leading jurisdictions issuing sovereign ṣukūk. 
Such harmonization of laws should take into consideration the unique 
nature of ownership in Islamic law which confers on the ṣukūk 
holder, who is supposed to be a co-owner of the underlying asset, the 
right to sell or transfer the asset to a third party.  
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However, the Sharī‘ah justification proffered by modern 
Muslim jurists should be enough to lay this controversy to rest. The 
conclusion remains that the legal and beneficial ownership 
bifurcation of ownership rights particularly in sovereign ṣukūk, does 
not contradict Sharī‘ah principles as there are numerous justification 
for such arrangements in Islamic jurisprudence. After all, the Torrens 
system, which requires registration of legal rights in a landed 
property, was not known during the early days of Islam. However, 
since it has been established that such a practice does not contradict 
any fundamental principle of the sharī‘ah and seeks to fulfil 
maṣlaḥah, hence, it has been adapted to be part of the sharī‘ah to 
facilitate project funding and promote infrastructural development. 
Nevertheless, reasonable safeguards must be introduced either 
through contractual arrangement or legal provisions to ensure that the 
rights of the investors are protected. In the case of sovereign ṣukūk, 
they must have recourse against the issuer/originator in the event of a 
default, even if it implies that they will be selling the property 
exclusively to the issuer/originator. However, the problem of 
utilizing a public property as the underlying asset of a sovereign 
ṣukūk, though convenient, may pose some jurisprudential and 
practical challenges in the case of default.  
 
 
 
 

